Canadian Journal of Psychology

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1949 ANNUAL MEETING

Montreal, May 26th, 27th, 28th

Correspondence regarding subscriptions should be sent to the Canadian Psychological Association, 100 St. George St., Toronto 5, Canada.

Manuscripts or correspondence on editorial matters or advertising should be sent to the Editor, John A. Long, Ontario College of Education, 371 Bloor St. West, Toronto, Canada.

Canadian Journal of Psychology

STATEMENT OF EDITORIAL POLICY

It has been suggested that potential contributors might profit from a more detailed statement of editorial policy than has yet been issued by the *Canadian Journal of Psychology*. The following statement is an effort to implement this suggestion.

1. Since the *Journal* is the sole organ of the Canadian Psychological Association it should reflect the varied interests of the entire C.P.A. membership. Consequently there are no restrictions on the types of materials which are assumed to be suitable. Any material which might appropriately appear in any general or in any specialized psychological journal will receive the editors' consideration.

2. Decisions as to the acceptability of manuscripts are left to the discretion of the editors. Preference is given to material likely to appeal widely to readers, and to material which, even though written for a limited audience, makes a real contribution to the advancement of psychology. As an aid in deciding on the acceptability of material the editors commonly seek the advice of outside readers.

3. Material for publication will be welcome from non-members as well as from members of the C.P.A.

4. Since many of the members of the C.P.A. are French-speaking, the *Journal* will be glad to consider for publication articles written in the French language.

5. In general, articles will be published in order of their receipt. Occasionally a manuscript will be published out of order because it happens to be appropriate to a special number, or because it happens to be the proper length to round out the pages available, or because its effectiveness depends on immediate publication.

6. Although the editorial staff of the *Journal* and of the University of Toronto Press devote a good deal of time to each manuscript accepted for publication, much labour could be saved if authors were to give more attention to style in the preparation of their material. Clarity of expression, uniformity of citation, and completeness of reference are essential in a satisfactory manuscript.

7. Manuscripts should be typed, double spaced, on 8½ x 11 sheets, with ample margins for proof-reading and editing. In preparing manuscripts the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* should constitute the guide in spelling. Footnotes should be numbered serially from the beginning to the end of the manuscript. They should all appear at the end of the article: the type-

setters will see that they appear as footnotes to the appropriate pages of the *Journal*. Upon request to the editor, a detailed style sheet will be mailed to any prospective contributor.

8. Tables and graphs are costly to reproduce and should be avoided where not essential.

9. It is not easy to place definite limits on the lengths of manuscripts to be submitted. The editors' views will necessarily be conditioned by the pressure or lack of pressure of material available for publication. It must be borne in mind, however, that each issue of the *Journal* comprises 48 printed pages. It may be well tentatively to consider 5,000 words as the upper limit to the length of an article. This would occupy about 12 pages of the *Journal* and four such articles would account for one issue. Authors should be as brief as possible, provided clarity is not sacrificed.

10. Book reviews have varied greatly in length. Reviewers are asked to consider 750 words as the maximum for any one review.

11. Twenty-five reprints of each article are supplied free of charge to the contributor. Beyond that a charge is made at a rate depending on the cost of publication at the time. At present the rate is 50 cents per page per 100 reprints. If the contributor wishes to make sure of receiving additional reprints a request for them should accompany the manuscript.

12. The editors believe it would be wise for Canadian psychologists to show a strong preference for publishing in their own journal. There is no doubt that authors of highly specialized articles can find a wider audience for their particular material in foreign journals of a specialized nature, but the editors feel that the publishing of challenging and important articles in a Canadian journal is one of the surest means of promoting the prestige and progress of psychology in Canada.

THE EDITORS

December, 1948

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ASSOCIATE COMMITTEE ON APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

At the meeting of the National Research Council, March 19, 1948, it was decided to appoint an Associate Committee on Applied Psychology for the purpose of fostering fundamental psychological research and its application to problems of national importance in Canada.

This marks the culmination of a series of steps through which the Canadian Psychological Association has collaborated with federal authorities since its formation in 1938. This history may be briefly recalled. Informally, the N.R.C. continuously assisted the C.P.A. in its national undertakings throughout the war. As a first step the N.R.C. convened a meeting in Ottawa on October 2, 1939, when representatives of the three Armed Services and of our Association discussed and approved the use of available psychological procedures relating to the appraisal, selection, and training of military personnel. Our Association, with the aid of private funds, thereupon set up a representative "War Committee" of eight members for the purpose of preparing and validating psychological materials on behalf of each of the Services.

Early in 1941 many of our Association members joined the Services, either in a military or civilian capacity, to apply these methods and materials. The need for further research and development was apparent from the start, and the Services themselves could not well provide for this at the time. Accordingly, the N.R.C. provided a grant for this purpose to Professor George Humphrey of Queen's University, who became chairman of a C.P.A. Test Research Committee. This body replaced the earlier War Committee of the Association and continued to function through 1946. Throughout the war this Research Committee was supported by annual grants from the N.R.C., and, working in collaboration with Personnel Selection Directorates in the Services, made many useful contributions.

The cessation of hostilities brought an end to the need for this work, but the need for psychological research in other directions remained, and appropriate steps were taken by our Association and by the Federal Government. In 1946, the C.P.A. established a Research Planning Committee in lieu of the Test Research Committee. Professor E. A. Bott became chairman, with Professor George Humphrey as secretary-treasurer. Professor R. B. MacLeod assumed the secretary-treasurership when Professor Humphrey left Canada to accept the chair in psychology at Oxford. The N.R.C. generously continued a grant to the treasurer of the C.P.A. Research Planning Committee to facilitate the working out of our Association's relationships to departments of the Federal Government during peace-time.

Meanwhile at Ottawa the creation of the Defence Research Board after the war made permanent provision for psychological research in the inter-

ests of defence, especially through the appointment of Dr. N. W. Morton under the Defence Research Board in March, 1947. In addition to the Department of National Defence, however, several federal departments had problems requiring psychological research, some more fully formulated than others, as for instance those of the Department of Veterans' Affairs. The Research Planning Committee of the C.P.A., with the effective assistance of Dr. Morton in Ottawa, systematically canvassed these departmental research needs so that they might be officially brought to the attention of the National Research Council (the proper body for implementing research for federal departments). The result was that by March of this year the N.R.C. had decided that the time had come to explore broadly several such fields for psychological research. The Council, accordingly, appointed an Associate Committee which could be given means to make such exploration and to implement the efforts of research workers and assist in the training of graduate students for research. In order to co-ordinate the psychological work already in progress in Defence Research with that to be developed under universities and various government departments by an N.R.C. Associate Committee, Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, President of the Council, suggested that Dr. Morton of the Defence Research Board act initially as chairman of the new Committee.

The Associate Committee is at present limited to eight members, as follows:

Chairman. Dr. N. W. Morton, Biological Research Division, Defence Research Board, Ottawa

Secretary. Dr. O. E. Ault, Director of Personnel Selection, Civil Service Commission, Ottawa

Members. Professor E. A. Bott, Professor of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto

Professor G. G. Brown, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto

Professor T. W. Cook, Professor of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon

Professor D. O. Hebb, Professor of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal

Professor N. Mailloux, Professor of Psychology, University of Montreal, Montreal

Dr. C. G. Stogdill, Chief, Mental Health Division, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa

The programme and a prospective budget for the Associate Committee is a matter for consideration during the remainder of this present fiscal year. The C.P.A. Research Planning Committee, having performed the main duty assigned it, will presumably not continue to have N.R.C. financial

support after March 1949, but the remainder of its current grant could usefully be employed to facilitate the transition from planning to practice, for example to survey psychological facilities in Canada with a view to promoting a programme involving concrete research projects and the training of selected research workers through the newly formed Associate Committee.

Meetings of the Associate Committee were held in Ottawa on July 27 and September 3. It was too late in the current year to secure funds or applications for ordinary scholarships for 1948-49, but a beginning has been made in considering grants-in-aid for suitable research projects by Association members connected with universities. A third meeting of the Associate Committee is contemplated in February, preparatory for 1949-50, when applications will be considered for a limited number of bursaries, scholarships, and fellowships to graduate students of exceptional promise in our field, and for grants-in-aid for members of university staffs for approved projects in psychology. The conditions and printed forms pertaining to these applications may be obtained from the Secretary-Treasurer, National Research Council, Ottawa. Completed applications for the fiscal year, April, 1949—March, 1950, should, in the case of grants, be in the Secretary-Treasurer's hands by February 15, 1949. The last date for receipt of applications for scholarships is March 1, 1949.

As noted above, a survey has been made of the kinds of psychological research problems arising from the varied interests of a number of Dominion Government departments. It is hoped that a significant portion of work undertaken under support from the N.R.C. can be directly related to these expressed needs with research workers still left wide freedom in the selection of topics for investigation. For the guidance of those who may be considering applications for research grants, a partial list of these areas of special interest follows:

Youth guidance techniques.

Methods of appraisal of adult workers for employment.

Counselling procedures in adult use.

Studies of job environmental conditions, supervision, and morale in government employments.

Methods of staff training and rating.

Clinical assessment methods.

Studies of the Canadian Indian.

Problems in aviation psychology (private and commercial flying), including crash accidents, assessment for licensing and employment, training, etc.

Industrial relations.

National-international attitudes.

Canadian sub-cultural relations.

Adjustment and orientation of new Canadians.

Assessment and guidance of penitentiary inmates.

Studies of genetic and developmental influences contributing to juvenile delinquency and criminal careers.

Effects of penal treatment.

Further detailed information can be provided by the undersigned on request with regard to opportunities for in-service work and the use of Dominion Government facilities for research purposes.

Our Associate Committee on Applied Psychology welcomes this opportunity of making known to the membership of our Association, through its *Journal,* this important advance in status accorded to psychology : it now becomes a companion of other sciences represented in the National Research Council. This advance is the result of a decade of substantial work to which many C.P.A. members contributed. May the next decade demonstrate that Canadian psychologists are worthy of this recognition.

On behalf of the Associate Committee,
O. E. AULT
Secretary

SHOULD PSYCHOLOGY ACCEPT THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF RELATIONS?[1]

E. A. BOTT
University of Toronto

PSYCHOLOGY has often proclaimed its divorce from philosophy. My argument will be that the two sciences have not yet separated and perhaps never will; or at least that psychology remains devoted to certain ways of thinking that have always been dear to the hearts of philosophers and metaphysicians. This uncritical devotion persists, notwithstanding that most psychologists nowadays are very mindful of their methods: of what and how to observe, of what are worthwhile questions for inquiry, of what evidence will warrant conclusions or generalizations, and so forth. Moreover, as psychologists we profess that this alertness is an aid in thinking clearly about our subject-matter; as James would say, of having a thoroughgoing metaphysic; or as we usually express it, of proceeding scientifically. Does our scientific procedure, however, manifest weakness as well as strength?

Whatever subject-matter one may choose to work with in psychology it will include certain factual phenomena, even though more may be involved. Acceptance of these observable, factual phenomena is, then, not a matter for doubt. Nevertheless, how these accepted phenomena are concerned with one another, or perhaps with ourselves, is not similarly free from doubt, and these relationships become a question for wonder and a matter for further study. Indeed, problems of relation normally prescribe our programmes of investigation. On this general plan of inquiry our "observable facts" are supposed to play a double role: they first command full acceptance as given; yet they are not fully satisfactory, for they demand further understanding regarding inter-relationships. From this incipient conflict in thinking, deliverance is desirable but difficult. Indeed, this conflict becomes a chronic metaphysical predicament to which we find ourselves committed. Whether we proceed with confidence or with hesitation will turn on how clearly we recognize any conflict in our accepted metaphysic. I suggest that this entire plan of inquiry, old and respectable though it be, deserves more reflection and reconsideration. But how should we commence such a task? For lack of a better approach let us start by considering one of the essential features of this metaphysical plan—its plea for fuller understanding of phenomena already regarded as factual.

The desire to understand the mental or physical phenomena we observe seems obviously to be a strong and persistent motive. To achieve understanding helps to satisfy curiosity on all kinds of questions for a time, at

least until some new observation and question arises and prompts desire for further understanding. The processes that comprise this search for understanding would seem an appropriate subject for scientific study, though it must be admitted their study is not as popular with scientists, or even with psychologists, as the study of observable phenomena in themselves. There is no denying that subject-matter on which understanding is exercised usually gets priority for inquiry over any questions about what the understanding of it implies.

No doubt the processes of understanding, regarded in detail, are very complex, as John Locke found when he set about writing his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Nevertheless, at the risk of over-simplification, I suggest that our constant quest for understanding can be considered as a simple recurrent undertaking that has two main steps. The first step consists in positing some kind of distinction in phenomena as given, and the second step is then the attempt to relate and unite the features thus taken to be distinct. Briefly, one can say, *differentiation,* accompanied by insistence on *unification,* provides the setting in which the search for understanding goes on. Viewed in this way, how are these two aspects of thinking supposed to operate?

In the first place, differentiation and unification, as used in this context, seem to be inseparable, complementary, and recurrent activities. But this is not all; a more significant point is that they seem to be antithetical. In a sense, to differentiate is to break phenomena asunder; but then unification takes over and mends or fuses what is thus severed so that what are different things become somehow an understandable whole.

Is either of these steps more crucially involved than the other in this mental interplay of things distinct and things united? If we agree that each of the steps is essential, do we consider, as some ancient thinkers held, that they operate on a perfect parity; that in the nature of things differentiation and unification are inevitable, but always as a partnership of activities wherein neither sundering nor uniting ever ceases or ever runs into an impasse? In principle, some such assumption as this finds many modern adherents; it regards the course of mental activity (or indeed of all activity) as a kind of harmony in strife, a perpetual adjustment, a moving equilibrium, which idealistic philosophers such as Hegel would describe as involving thesis, antithesis, synthesis, rather than as a combination of the two steps just described as antithetical.

Whatever descriptive formulation is preferred, I am far from convinced that any view of differentiation and unification as a partnership is obvious, or necessary, or unquestionable. As an alternative, does it not make as good sense to consider that differentiation itself works some mischief or violence on phenomena, so that unification, otherwise pointless, becomes indis-

pensable as a corrective? That is to say, if observable phenomena have characteristic unity, this property would not have to be defended were it not threatened. Or putting it the other way round, if phenomena be regarded in such a way that their unity is plainly called in question, then a step to assure unification will be called for in defence. On this view of the matter, so long as differentiation contrives to rend phenomena in a way that both gives distinctions and also proclaims that there is a problem about their connection, then, as we have said, assurance will be needed about unification as an answer to this problem. In any case differentiation does something that leaves us uneasy, but now it is the problem of relations that traps our attention, not the step that set this trap and caught us in it. Differentiation leaves unity dubitable, plainly enunciated as a problem; hence demonstration of unity is as plainly required. On this premise of how thinking operates, differentiation can be practised at a price; the cost is to undertake a programme of relating in order to satisfy the problem that differentiation propounds. The task of understanding is to see this programme through to its finish—to secure unification upon which the step of differentiation casts some doubt.

Our second point is that unification is subsidiary to differentiation. The antithesis we spoke of does not strictly concern differentiating and uniting; its root goes much deeper than that; at bottom we would say the antithesis lies in a special form of partitioning that differentiation adopts, which requires a special step of unification to amend it. Whether analysis of phenomena can in fact be done in some other positivistic manner that would not demand this supplement of relating is, of course, a nice systematic question which should receive as much attention as is now given to pursuing the problem of relations. But to enter critically upon that analytical issue here would lead us too far afield. Our present purpose is rather to see with what success the process of understanding can supply the demand for unification once this problem of relations is accepted as an essential undertaking that differentiation prescribes.

Lastly, to generalize our contention, we are of the opinion that in science, as in daily discourse, the procedure regularly followed in thinking is to differentiate in such a way that the subject-matter is wittingly bifurcated and thus made problematical. There will then be a problem, of course, to understand how phenomena, now separated out as opposites, are yet a unified whole. Moreover, this unifying task addressed to understanding is always to be carried through adroitly, without falling into contradiction or into some other failure to promote understanding. Strictly, the systematic issue in this programme is simple enough; the objective is to unify what is differentiated, and the outcome will be success or failure. And what is the outcome? Does the attempt to arrive at unification ever succeed? Or, are

we correct in holding that our quest for understanding succeeds rather in multiplying distinctions which in turn are as much in need of uniting as any? If the latter be the outcome, as I think it is, the whole procedure would seem to be naive and uncritical. In any event the history of psychology on ways of thinking has variously interpreted this undertaking.

Sympathetic interpretations of this undertaking and its outcome incline to the view that each of these steps, differentiation and unification, at once requires and also renews the other; that they cannot get free from their problem of relations and are mutually concerned to cope with it, the problem being ever present and recurrent. On the other hand, a more discriminating interpretation would be to wonder whether this outcome ever amounts in principle to more than sheer repetition of the step of differentiation. In these broad issues, of course, as in smaller daily troubles, we can seek escape through wishful thinking. If there is need to rationalize failures in understanding, we may endeavour to believe that this repetitive process is not a mere regressus, that thinking amounts to more than a circular process and is at least a spiral. Indeed, as our forms of differentiation become more refined and as attempts to arrive at their relationships become more intricate, we assume that the fund of knowledge is increased. But whether this means progress in understanding, or merely procrastination in criticism, is another matter.

How then should criticism proceed? The answer, as regards ways of thinking, seems to be that criticism must stay wholly within a postulated procedure or else get wholly out of it, which would then mean abiding strictly within some other plan. Any compromise between conflicting starting-points gives confusion, not understanding. We have suggested that critical inquiry should broaden out in order to be directed forcibly upon the root of this plan, namely, the step of differentiation, rather than apply only upon its offshoot, the problem of relations. But criticism normally does not go that far; it uses differentiation as a postulate which it does not challenge. The task for critical inquiry is then strictly limited to the step of relating, while the differentiation that prompts this inquiry remains unquestioned and above suspicion. This is obviously a significant bias in starting-point; it uncritically endorses a step that presents the problem of relations, and then prescribes a search through understanding which may be as critical and as thorough as we like.

A familiar example of this bias in starting-point is our ordinary distinction between organism and environment. Broadly speaking, this is a form of spatial differentiation which we are not only prepared to grant but will agree is easier to accept than to query. But, with this distinction accepted, there is a problem of understanding the relationship between organism and environment, or between organisms in a common environment. The reason we do not criticize our primary differentiations is not merely because

this is not easy to do; it is because some plan of analysis other than ordinary differentiation in terms of bifurcation would be required; otherwise we only substitute one preferred bifurcation for another. If then we remain within the plan we are discussing, which differentiations should be preferred to start with?

The selection that investigators make among the most common and familiar differentiations goes a long way towards fixing the boundaries of their particular science, particularly in the establishing of a new science. Psychology, though no longer new in the sense of professing a scientific outlook, remains notably uncertain about what to accept as its primary differentiations. Certain old-fashioned models, such as Body and Mind, are happily more or less outmoded in our day, because so little was accomplished toward understanding their relationship. But this relief is largely offset, I fear, by the fact that while most of us agree that in psychology we deal, say, with "The Individual," we remain unsure of what else is to be postulated as our primary differentiation. We are not clear what limits differentiate the individual, human or sub-human, psychologically speaking. Our trouble is not with terminology, though that can be troublesome, too. It is in finding and clarifying the primary differentiations we choose to start with. Psychology has shown preference for various selections: for example, ideating subject and his conscious content, or should it be nervous system and elements of consciousness, or the conscious and the unconscious, or stimulus and response, or figure and ground, or person and situation, or something else? Nor does the recent interest in "field" views of relationship relieve us from uncertainty about which key distinctions to adopt in order that we may proceed to further understanding of relationships. As our proposed bifurcations become more sophisticated they usually become less easy to postulate, more debatable, and competitive with or even intolerant of others.

Our main point here is not differences in such starting-points as regards content or presumed usefulness; it is rather their likeness which, I submit, is a weakness they both have. Whatever differentiation we accept will have its problem of relationships and hence the need for further understanding. To prefer some settings on the claim of their being elemental or in some sense fundamental is of doubtful assistance, because those settings are the most abstract and the most difficult to postulate except among their own advocates. Positive criteria for comparison of starting-points might be, first, whether we all can do with confidence what is postulated, and second, how far the given distinction can lead us in understanding. To the critic of differentiation, the outcome is likely to be as unconvincing for one form of bifurcatory distinction as another; but be that as it may, we can afford to try any basis of differentiation and judge it in terms of the further relations and problems to which it can lead.

How do we find our way into the relations implied in the problem set

by a given differentiation? At the outset we often start by merely guessing the implied relationships and then trying to improve and verify this beginning by further thought and planned experiment. Even a guess about a problematical relationship may have considerable pertinence, because it usually embodies an analogy borrowed from some more familiar phase of experience which is assumed to have a good deal in common with the problem under consideration. The usefulness of any simile as an aid in thinking out problems will depend on how clear we are about relations in the simile itself and how far they can furnish clues about the main relationship we seek to understand. Thus when we say succinctly that a stimulus "arouses" a sensation, we do not intend this simile, which may refer, for example, to shaking someone into wakefulness or some such familiar situation, to be taken too literally. Yet such a borrowed idea suffices well enough to start us off carefully differentiating many distinguishable factors, spatially and temporally related, which seem to give fuller understanding about the relatively gross bifurcation of stimulus and sensation with which we began. We relinquish the simile but retain the differentiation.

A final point may be mentioned which often troubles this procedure of trying to understand some relationships through the aid of other relationships presumably better understood. Understanding, as here interpreted, is essentially a reciprocal and self-sustaining process. In part it deals with phenomena as given facts, and, in part, it uses phenomena as hypothetical constructs to help "ex-plain" (i.e. set forth plainly) problematical relationships concerning the given facts. But reciprocity in these factors, differentiated as factual or as hypothetical, may lead to misunderstanding, since it sometimes becomes difficult to say whether a particular feature in the undertaking is a point of fact or a part of the story of relations that is to lend understanding about those facts. This ambiguity arises because the accounts of relationship uncover new facts of observation which in turn demand further understanding of their relationship. Psychological inquiry often faces this dilemma of being uncertain whether some principal factor, say the Unconscious, is an unquestionable fact or only an explanatory device to help understand phenomena that are factual though problematical. Should we conclude that confusion of this sort is a case of faulty understanding, or may differentiation itself be at fault as the primary source of confusion? In any event, if we postulate differentiation to start with, we must accept it for better or for worse.

To sum up the points of our argument respecting understanding and the problem of relations: In the view about thinking which we have examined, differentiation is accepted as axiomatic; no criticism or question about that step is deemed desirable or permissible. Bifurcatory distinctions thus granted in phenomena are postulated as factual, that is, literally as some-

thing done; but also they are granted to be problematical, that is, as demanding that something further be done. To satisfy this further demand is to achieve understanding. In effect, this supplementary phase of the process amounts to tracing out a story about relationships which should resolve (i.e. do away with) the original problem. A full account of relationships aims to reveal how in fact the differentiated factors are united, that is, the step of unification. Hypothetical guesses are used to further the story of relationships. Initially, these may be homely similes, or later, very complex mental constructions, either of which may spur the ceaseless search for understanding. But our search for understanding in no way unites what we differentiate: instead we come on newly differentiated facts which offer new problems of relationship. These may replace previous ones in our search as giving more understanding and hence as being a suitable starting-point for further search. The solution of a problem, therefore, is reached only by substituting another problem assumed to be farther along the road to fuller understanding. A bias in favour of accepting without question bifurcated subject-matter at any point, and of inquiring critically only into problematical relationships pertaining to what is differentiated, limits the range of criticism as pertinent only to one phase of this programme, its search into relationships. Enthusiasm for further search, or as we say, for "re-search," fortifies this bias and quiets any suspicion or debate about the adequacy of bifurcatory differentiation. This starting-point, with its problem, and its constant search for understanding, has long claimed to be essential in science as in daily life, in fact, to be the only way to think.

Is psychology content to endorse this position? Our very ineptness in applying this way of inquiry may have a lesson to teach. In psychology, our false starts, our many schools of thought, our lack of any single unifying hypothesis, may not be matters for embarrassment or apology at all. They should be a hint as well as a warning that a more powerful critique is required than that which postulates differentiation with its problem of relations. This means that systematic difficulties peculiar to psychology are critically suggestive; they put us in the advantageous position of coming to close grips with limiting weaknesses in a point of view which is often held and which deserves critical examination. Along with that conviction goes the privilege, if not the obligation, of pursuing ways of analysis, if we can, which would not necessarily turn on solving any elusive problem of relations. Instead, we might look for ways of analysis which are not bifurcatory in basis and hence have no problem of relations or need of a story of unification.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRITICISM AND THE
CRITICISM OF PSYCHOLOGISTS

JOHN R. SEELEY
National Committee for Mental Hygiene (Canada)

THE ostensible or overt ground of this article, apart from its covert sources in the dim resources of the personality, or its genetic roots in the writer's life-history, or its sociological implication as a part of the struggle for status, is an attempt to clarify the conditions for effective criticism on which, in my judgment, the life of our science depends. The life of science depends on criticism, not, of course, in the sense that criticism is a sufficient condition, but in the sense that it is a necessary condition for the establishment of truth.

A number of circumstances, relatively new in the history of science, have conspired in our day to produce an atmosphere that is at best indifferent to criticism, and, at worst, inimical to it. Some of these circumstances spring directly from science itself, and more particularly from the social sciences, including psychology. And some of them spring primarily from economic, political, and sociological changes. That the process can continue until the traditional canons of criticism, and finally of "truth," are entirely subverted or replaced is hardly open to intelligence to doubt. Indeed, we already have before us in the relatively "safe" field of biological genetics the spectacle of Mendelian theory being haled into court because it appears to threaten a theory of political order which has extended itself into a cosmology.

The two scientific discoveries that have muddied the once limpid-seeming pool of scientific discussion are those associated respectively with the names of Freud and Marx. Neither of these men delivered himself of a full-term baby, wholly new in the universe, but each must, nevertheless, assume major responsibility for the paternity of his child.

Freud's invaluable insights are too numerous to pay tribute to here. But among those most relevant to our problem are probably the following: (1) that a person's behaviour at any instant can be traced to his experience in the past, and, more particularly, his remotest past—infancy or before; (2) that any sample of behaviour must be referred to the appropriate context of the person's life-history in order to be "understood"; (3) that all behaviour is the resultant of "forces" of which the behaviour is unconscious (or an interplay of unconscious and conscious forces); and, therefore, (4) that things are rarely or never what they seem.

To Marx we owe the notion of "ideology." Practised in polemics, he was able frequently to confound, confuse, and intimidate his opponents, as his followers still do today, by drawing attention to the peculiar and there-

fore "biased" way in which they made their analyses. He asserted that their mode of analysis was "bourgeois" or "reactionary," and, in many cases, the assertion was patently well grounded; so well grounded, in fact, that opposition was frequently put to rout. What he could point out, quite correctly, with or without the whole dialectical apparatus, was that much of the analysis of social matters that passes for social "science" contains in its manner of asking questions, in its tools of analysis, and in its interpretations of "findings," a hidden value position which, if made explicit, would more or less clearly identify it as the common possession of a "social class."

This method of analysing scientific materials remained almost a monopoly of Marxists for some time. It was a polemical weapon of first-rate importance, striking as it did at the very roots of the self-confidence of the opposing camp—at their confidence in their ability to form any valid conclusions at all. It also tended to push conflict in the direction of violence, since the field of discussion was pre-empted by one of the protagonists, the one who maintained that only in his position no bias lay.

Two sets of events converged to generalize Marx's mode of analysis; and this in a double sense. First came the splitting off of sects and splinter groups from the orthodox body of Marxian thought and organization. Habit inclined the orthodox to aim at the heretics the same thunderbolt that had been so successful in confuting the heathen. "Right-wing deviationist," "diversionist," "Trotskyite," "menshevik," and later "Fascist" and "neo-Fascist," became the names not only of bodies of dissenters, but of whole "ideologies" which "vitiated" the thinking of all but the orthodox believers. The heretics, who had been accustomed to use the weapon and not have it used upon them, began to turn it upon the orthodox, and the battle of ideologies was on. It required then only the emergence of a sociologist of the calibre of Karl Mannheim to see and state the generalization which might be discerned above the smoke and heat of battle. This valid generalization states that one's view of society is, in greater or less degree, a "function of" the position one holds in it. Social scientists cannot escape this generalization since they are (partly) human, but the hope runs that they may learn to allow for it. This marks the generalization of Marx's insight in the first sense. Its generalization in the second sense refers to its becoming a commonplace of scientific and lay knowledge.

Much the same thing has happened to the Freudian insights. Either in the original form in which Freud set them forth, or in a distorted version, they are part of the coinage of everyday exchange. And again, like the Marxian polemic, they seem to have thrown all opposition, at least in the beginning, into dizzy retreat. If the orthodox alone had the truth, and if to put forward a different explanation was merely to manifest conscious or unconscious "resistance," instead of conscious or unconscious ideology;

and, if, further, the explanation for the resistance lay in some reprehensible incident in infancy, instead of a reprehensible bourgeois past or present, then it became very difficult and very dangerous to bring any of the psycho-analytical theories into discussion. The last word always lay, as with the Marxists, with those who had the weapon as against those who had it not.

One of the most ironic chapters in the history of ideas must surely be that which, when it is written, will describe how the possessors of these two weapons turned them on one another. The Marxists linked up the concrete findings and the methods of psychoanalysis with the essentially bourgeois and "anti-proletarian" bias of its practitioners; and the psycho-analysts in their turn linked up the excessive "rationality" and economy-mindedness of the Marxists with aspects of their toilet-behaviour and weaning which do not need to be made explicit here. So the psychoanalyst thinks as he does because of his income (or his father's), and the Marxist as he does because his "Oedipus" was badly handled. Let us return, however, to the problem of criticism.

Three more sets of considerations, economic, political, and sociological, are needed to give the problem its full background in the present.

On the economic side, the concentration of business into huge commercial and industrial aggregates, the contraction of markets in spatial terms, the extension and intensification of specialization, plus the improvement of old and the appearance of new technologies, have converged, now as causes and now as effects, to give advertising, the advertising man, and advertising morality, the place they have in our society. That a leader in the advertising field could in all seriousness say recently that advertising is (not "ought to be" but "is") the imparting of knowledge and is indistinguishable from education, is a monument to the technique and the morality of advertising. This point probably needs no further spelling out. For those who like a footnote to an article, I will refer to Dale Carnegie's best-seller *How to Win Friends and Influence People*. In any case, the idea that one's first consideration ought to stress the effect a statement will have on its hearers (rather than its truth or untruth), and the further idea that the major effect to be looked for is the popularity or unpopularity of the speaker (instead of its effect on the clarification of the point at issue) has gone far to create a climate in which any kind of discussion cannot long survive. In fact, the very fountainhead of communication is so far poisoned that it is doubtful whether a society freely dedicated to such principles can long hold together. For it now becomes necessary to carry on so complicated an operation that most people cannot manage it, and many would not think it worthwhile. One should, I suppose, have an eye, or perhaps a corner of one, on the topic. Then one must disengage the "meaning" in one sense from

the "meaning" in the other sense: the meaning in terms of its manipulative intent from the meaning in terms of the referents of the symbols used. Lastly, if one has a Freudian bent, one should be separating the overt from the latent content, in terms now of origin or source rather than goal or intent. How one does all this (and perhaps a sociological analysis simultaneously) and still carries on a conversation that is meaningful in the plain-language sense is a little difficult to understand.

However it is to be done in practice, the belief is now widespread, not only that communication should take the "feelings" of the other into account, but, further, that communication is primarily an essay in his "gratification," and the ostensible content of communication a mere vehicle for this "conversation of mutual influencings." It is at least no longer possible to assume that what both parties are after is truth, and that they are prepared to assume some personal discomfort in the search for it.

From the political side comes an expansion of the area of activity of "government" (and a corresponding contraction of the area of "the private") and a sense of continuously imminent political crisis. There is also a swing in the climate of opinion that tends to underrate individuality and differentiation as "against" collectivity and "unity." The first, the expansion of government activity, makes problems connected with government, and particularly problems dealing with authority, into matters of central importance for discussion and criticism. At the same time, the other two, the sense of political crisis and the swing to collectivism, make doubly difficult and unwelcome a thoroughgoing critical approach to the sacredness of the particular sacred cows of the moment, whether these cows are in the traditional or the rebel corral.

The sociological considerations are wedded to the economic and the political. The considerations already discussed have resulted in a picture far different from that of the individual scientist pursuing alone and disinterestedly the beacon or will-o'-the-wisp of truth. He is now, much more often, a part of a complex machine, a "man under authority" very like Jesus' centurion, a man with a job held largely at someone's discretion, a man whose status depends less on his ideas than his connection with an institution. It is hard to see, since his employers may accept the market valuation of his researches, how he can escape feeling threatened by criticism in a far more immediate and pressing sense than if mere "narcissism" or normal human identification with one's ideas were involved. Not mere vanity, but vanity, job, position in a hierarchy; not life, but "a living," are bound up with the validity of his ideas.

Now the situation described has, no doubt, a profound bearing on the creative half of the scientific effort. We are all familiar with the potentially

valuable scientist who will not commit his views to paper because he has too lively an awareness of the barrage of criticism he is likely to meet. He fears to expose himself, with a nearly "literal" fear. But I am less concerned about this at the present moment, since the net result is probably a diminution of the amount of material published that carries on its face its own refutation. If good findings do not reach the light of day because of false fears of rigorous criticism, the situation is unhappy but not much can be done about it. If, on the other hand, they are withheld for fear of illegitimate criticism there is ground for concern. Before attempting to say what illegitimate criticism is, it might be profitable to turn aside to consider what it is *not*.

Among the many suggestions that have recently come to hand from scientific and other colleagues are the following canons of legitimate criticism: (1) it should be balanced: one should attempt to offset a "bad" statement with a "good" one; (2) the criticism should take as a central consideration the position of the man criticized in reference to certain ethical goods: one should not criticize the scientific error of a man whose position is otherwise "sound" lest one damage his chances in the fight for his sound ideas; (3) criticism must take for granted the identification of men with their ideas, and it is foolish to make enemies; (4) criticism must be "constructive"; (5) criticism must not be "destructive"; (6) the critic must not appear to enjoy criticism.

The first position, the plea for good-bad balance, hardly merits examination. It would make criticism a kind of ritual dance that might have its interest as ritual but would hardly add much to clarity, unless one read every alternate sentence or paragraph to discovery the critic's true intentions.

The second position is much harder to deal with. It has all the appeal of an "ethic of responsibility" in place of an "ethic of principle." It suggests convincingly that the critic must be concerned about the total field, of which his criticism and his science are only a part; and, as a fair inference, that where this wider good might be damaged, he should refrain from criticizing. That this situation sometimes exists, can hardly be doubted. Shall we say, "But the king is naked. . ." and so bring the realm tottering down and all its goods and glories with it; or shall we refrain from speaking, or speak only to those who already see? It is a nice dilemma and each must answer as best he may. Personally I rest my case with Dewey, on the incalculability of the remote consequences of action, and, hence, a return to an ethic of principle, and with a reversal of the field suggested. The reversal holds that, whatever may be the appearances, the scientist believes (i.e. it is his function to believe) that, *in the long run*, whatever serves truth serves all other goods; or, at least, that no other good can be served by what disserves truth.

The third contention returns us to the "how to make friends" level of morality. Moreover, it unjustly impugns countless scientists who do rise above this level. Who of us has not seen profound and worthwhile friendships initiated on the basis of fearless criticism?

The fourth contention, that criticism must be "constructive" is a little vague as to meaning. When pressed, the contender may say that it ought not to be "mere criticism, but go on to something constructive." The "something constructive" is not too clear, but usually turns out to mean a substitute creation for the creation criticized. That this would be a nice act of expiation or atonement I cannot deny. That it is at all necessary, or that it is a reasonable expectation, I do. As a matter of fact, the possibility of such an "atonement" raises a question about the psychology of the critic, which, with the examination of the next two contentions, becomes urgent.

The fifth contention, that criticism must not be destructive, is either a restatement in diluted form, of the "must be constructive" view, or else it is referable to the sixth contention that the critic ought not to appear to enjoy criticism. Taking the latter view, one might ask why, if criticism is a legitimate activity like plumbing (up to a point), the critic should be debarred from showing enjoyment of his work. In a commercial setting, the auditor, a great part of whose task it is to find mistakes made by others and draw them to attention, may be regarded by the book-keeper or the office-boy as reprehensible if he whistles at his work. But with the owner of the corporation, whose identification with the enterprise tends to be somewhat different, a certain beagle-like enjoyment of the hunt-for-errors is not likely to count in disfavour of the auditor (except where deliberate errors have been made by the owner).

The whole question of the "destructiveness" of the critic, or his "enjoyment of criticism" does, however, call up what is probably a cardinal truth in the psychology of criticism, or, rather, of the critic. Introspection suggests, and empirical observation confirms, an enjoyment of their work by most rigorous critics beyond the point that could be fully explained by a craftsmanlike pride in a job well done, though that is doubtless involved. Of the half dozen or so whose critical methods and whose lives are both in greater or less degree open to me, all have had lives that would lead one to expect a substantial fund of "irrational," "unconscious," and "structural" hostility. There are some trick-words in that statement and they may need looking at again. The hostility is "irrational" only in its genesis; in its "displacements" or in its targets, rationality—reason *and* reasonableness—may have had an important or preponderant share. Again "unconscious" may well refer to roots and motivation, but not to the existence of the hostility itself. The term "structural," which suggests that the hostility depends on the character and not on the situation, must *not* be thought to exclude the

possibility that only "apt" or "desirable" situations for its expression are employed. In fact, if criticism is valued, then the channelling of irrational hostility into criticism, is, in the current jargon, a "sublimation," and therefore "a good thing."

But while sublimation may be a good thing, the scientist may be inclined to ask for a better, namely criticism which does not show or does not have irrational hostility as its (partial) "motive." To the recommendation that the critic should not "show" the ground of his criticism I know no answer, except that the dissembling involved is itself a hindrance to the sharpening of the critical temper, and that, therefore, if we want good (i.e. sharp) criticism we had best not lay this distracting task on the critic. To the recommendation that the critic should not have irrational hostility, I can only say that I do not know if this is in fact possible. Criticism is so hard, so unrewarding, and so thankless a task, that it is difficult to believe on *a priori* grounds that anyone would willingly and wittingly engage in it. If there are to be critics, they must be driven more or less unwillingly by more or less unwitting impulses, or else an altogether different scale of reward must be held out as inducement. Does anyone know, through observation, of a painstaking and thorough critic in whom there is little (not to say no) irrational hostility? I know of none, personally or by hearsay.

There is another facet of the psychology of the critic of which his victim should be not altogether unaware when the canons for the motivation of legitimate criticism are laid down. For the same psycho-dynamic reasons that account for their irrational hostility, critics—those I have observed— are more than ordinarily sensitive to "withdrawal of affection." They are therefore more than ordinarily tempted to "dissemble themselves before men," and to forego destructive criticism for the sake of unity and good feeling. If it is really possible for them to get rid of their hostilities, which, psychoanalysis to the contrary, I doubt; or to displace them elsewhere, which I fear is all too readily possible; if either course is possible, should it be encouraged? Should we so construct the situation that the critic has an additional temptation to foresake the hard, cold loneliness of his sentrypost for the soft, warm friendship in the barracks?

On the grounds we have discussed, as well as others, the suggested canons for "legitimate" criticism should probably be dismissed as ethically bad or psychologically impossible, or both. We probably must, if the bracing air of criticism is to be preserved for us at all, be prepared to allow the critic a great deal of latitude. We may ask that criticism be valid, cogent, clear. But what else? Probably very little: that the critic be as impersonal as possible, that he refrain from scurrility and that he stick to his last.

And what of the reciprocity of obligations? What of the protection of the probably more tender plant of creation? What becomes of it when the

critic is bound by no other restraint than those suggested? Not much can be said. Some work will die *in statu nascendi* because the mother fears to bring the child into a hostile world. This is a danger. Some work will die in the chill winds because it is not fitted to survive. That is no loss; in the full sense it never lived. But what survives will be able to march bravely in the progress of science and towards the betterment of mankind. And the alternative in the struggle of ideas, as in the jungle, seems to be the survival of the unfit.

Need one say more? Need one add for creator and critic alike, divided as they are now in the scientific division of labour, that what "ought to" unite them is what transcends both functions, the service of science itself?

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN A PRIVATE
SOCIAL WORK AGENCY

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THE past quarter-century has seen some vital changes in social work. There has been an accelerated movement away from the earlier emphasis on "doing good," supplying charity, and, in general, deciding what is best for other people. There has been a growing emphasis on social case work in which a relationship of a growth-permitting sort is the central feature. A more specific change, the one in which we will be most interested here, has been the development of a healthy scepticism within the field. By this we mean simply the growing awareness of social workers of the importance of evaluation of their own work.

As little as twenty years ago, practically no scientific thought was given to such matters as the extent to which clients benefited from contact with an agency, the degree to which their lives were eventually altered, the presence of factors making case work either more or less likely to be effective, the possibility of predicting the outcome of treatment, or the likelihood that new approaches would prove fruitful. Social workers did not criticize their work in any technical, scientific sense, however critical they may have been in a more casual, non-investigative way. During the thirties, however, a new criticism developed and searching questions began to be asked.

In the Big Brother Movement of Toronto, a boys' counselling centre dealing with disturbed school-age boys through case work and clinical services, the type of criticism to which we refer was formalized in 1939. In that year was completed a follow-up study of 161 juvenile delinquents who had been referred to the agency by the Juvenile Court six years earlier.[1] Some had clearly "succeeded" and some had clearly "failed." The research in point asked why, and sought to locate significant factors. To this end, a tremendous body of information was amassed concerning the lives of the boys both during the six-year period and prior to it. Analysis revealed that positively related to success were: I.Q., length of time at school, economic status, stability of home surroundings, quality of companions, and group interests. Negatively related to success were: number of court appearances, number of times the family moved, and the absence of one or both parents.

The following paragraphs from a published summary of the study indicate its analytical interests.

Practical Implications—(1) This study has tried to throw some light on the question why some juvenile delinquents succeed in later life while others fail. To this end it has isolated those factors associated most frequently with the two types of adjustment (i.e. homes, districts, companions, etc.). Knowledge of these factors should

[1]V. Lorne Stewart, "A Follow-up Study of a Group of 161 Juvenile Delinquents" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Toronto, 1939).

help us to determine our strategy in an attack on the problem—both from a sociological and a psychological approach.

(2) The study indicates the need of a more critical and scientific approach in case work with problem boys for the purpose of crime prevention and personality adjustment. It shows the necessity of measuring progress during the boy's development and of evaluating the effectiveness of the social work and mental hygiene techniques being used.

(3) It points out the need for analyzing still further the basic causes of failure. This could be done by going more intensively into the history and present status of the "failure" group. The leads we get in this study suggest to us that the following four factors are very fundamental—especially psychologically—in the causation of crime: (A) over-indulgence, over-protection and "spoiling" by the home, i.e. lack of independence of thought and action and lack of the idea of self-reliance; (B) inability to "get along" freely and naturally when playing, working and living with others—a psychological factor underlying these expressions; (C) idleness; (D) home "atmosphere." This refers to those tensions that are natural in a home in which there is marital discord, and unsatisfactory relationship between parents and children, low moral standards, or overcrowding.[2]

It was felt that in this study a good start had been made towards sorting out the significant factors.

In 1942, another study[3] carried the matter further and dealt with the problem in terms of prediction. The first step here was an investigation of the applicability of the prediction outline already worked out by the Gluecks.[4] It was found that this outline, for a variety of reasons, was not sensitive enough for the task at hand. By a statistical approach to cases treated in the past with varying degrees of success, the author isolated six significant factors and assigned weights to them. These factors were: (1) the moral standards of the home, (2) the presence of "bad habits," (3) the length of time elapsing between the first misbehaviour and the application for service, (4) the discipline provided by the father, (5) the discipline provided by the mother, (6) school conduct. An ensuing study of 75 new cases was strongly suggestive of the validity of the six-point scale.

During the present year, Mr. G. J. Aldridge, our case work and clinical supervisor, has carried the investigation of significant factors still further.[5] His procedure was to select from 437 cases closed during 1945 and 1946, 100 "successes" and 100 "failures." (Space does not permit going into the matter of criteria for "success" or "failure.") To these 200 cases, the six-point scale mentioned above was applied. The scale item "Bad Habits" was found to be non-differentiating as between the two groups. The significance of the other five was verified.

The next step was to select two groups of ten cases each from the 100

[2]*What Happens to Juvenile Delinquents* (Big Brother Movement, Toronto, 1939).

[3]Alex Bentley, "Predictability in the Behaviour of Boys" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Toronto, 1942).

[4]Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1934).

[5]Gordon J. Aldridge, "Factors Contributing to Success or Failure in Case-work with School-age Boys" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Toronto, 1948).

"successes" and 100 "failures," which were comparable in terms of score on the new five-point scale. Analysis revealed the significance of five *more* factors: continuing membership in organized groups, marital discord, lack of co-operation from the boy, lack of co-operation from the parents, and the regularity of counselling periods. In effect, a ten-point predictive scale had been arrived at which is capable of helping the worker to sort out the assets and liabilities contained in given situations.

Somewhat similar in purpose to the above projects was a follow-up study of 80 boys and young men who received vocational guidance during the years 1940 and 1941.[6] These subjects ranged in age from thirteen to thirty-one. At the time of counselling, the following steps were taken: (1) social history, (2) intelligence test, (3) personality and attitude tests, (4) interest inventory, (5) aptitude tests, (6) interpretation and counselling.

The cases were followed up in a variety of ways, approximately two years after guidance was given. On the basis of the information obtained about the subject's life during the two-year interval, and through the help of a council of judges (psychiatrist, psychologist, business executive, teacher, and case worker) the cases were classified as "successes" or "failures." The general conclusion was that those who had accepted and done something about their counselling periods were better satisfied, earned better wages, and seemed to have better prospects. These were the subjects who tended to have better than average intelligence and education, and whose home surroundings were relatively good.

Further research, of a somewhat different kind, was carried out under Big Brother guidance in 1944. This was the investigation of boys' street gangs, published under the title *Street Gangs in Toronto*.[7] Three field workers spent the summer "finding out about" the gangs existing in various sections of the city: their existence, frequency, membership, and activities. A variety of novel exploratory and rapport-obtaining techniques were devised and a large body of information collected about gangs and their formation. The significance of such factors as lack of recreational facilities, rejection by existing facilities, indifference of parents, poor housing, gang traditions, and the movies was clearly pointed up. The need for trained workers to discover the boys' gangs of the city and to guide them to existing recreational facilities was made obvious, and the type of work that would be required was given an approximate pattern.

So much for the major research efforts of the agency. There have been, in addition, a number of relatively minor projects concerned further with significant factors in human adjustment, and one large project, the primary aim of which is therapeutic but which involves some research. To Camp

        [6]Gordon J. Aldridge, "Clinical Vocational Guidance in a Social Agency" (Big Brother Movement, Toronto, 1943. Unpublished).

        [7]Kenneth H. Rogers, *Street Gangs in Toronto* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1946).

Beausoleil last summer we took thirty-three emotionally disturbed boys; boys who, for one reason or another, seemed unlikely to benefit from the traditional type of camp, designed to fit the psychological stature of the "normal" boy. Some were recessive boys. Some were overly aggressive. Others pilfered, wet their beds, failed at school, or lacked friends. They varied in age from ten to fifteen. Along with the boys went their case workers, who attempted to continue treatment within the framework of a decentralized and permissive camp setting.

Unfortunately, although a detailed record of each boy's behaviour was kept, no over-all assessment or collation of facts was feasible. To make adequately such an assessment presupposes the presence during camp of a full-time observer and recorder. This luxury was lacking. Certain general findings did emerge, however, which pointed up specific areas where research was most needed, such as the prediction of camp behaviour, the choosing of cases most likely to benefit, and the selection of boys for cabin groups.

During the summer of 1948, a special three-week period at Camp Beausoleil will be conducted again under Big Brother auspices, although this year outside counsellors will be employed.* Of special interest for research will be the presence of the agency psychologist. One of the psychologist's duties, perhaps his chief duty, will be the comprehensive recording of what happens to each boy at camp. This recording will not be through tests and check-lists and forms, which we hope to keep to a minimum, but rather a portrayal, in meaningful word pictures, of what camp has meant to each boy. It is planned that each counsellor, instead of making daily written reports, shall confer with the psychologist, and that the latter shall do the bulk of the recording on the basis of the conferences. The psychologist will fit the facts within the framework suggested by the question, "What is happening in and to this boy?" The boys themselves will be observed more or less continuously. The psychologist, on the basis of about two months of preparation, will know each boy's history in some detail, and will be responsible, on the advice of the director, for providing counsellors with special information or suggestions regarding their charges. We anticipate obtaining a wealth of valuable material through our camp research this year, and are hoping that some write-up of the study will eventually be possible.

During the past ten years, then, in the Big Brother Movement of Toronto, there has been a growing tendency to examine ourselves, our techniques, and our clients with a critical eye, in order to ascertain the means of improving all three. In other words, we have become increasingly research minded. This movement has been paralleled in many other agencies, probably the best known of which is the Jewish Board of Guardians in New York City, whose intensive work is the envy of us all.

*This paper was prepared in the Spring of 1948.

In continuing development, the agency psychologist must be expected to play an important role. The research involved cannot be carried out adequately without a sound methodology, and this is one area in which psychologists usually have better training than social workers. Nor can it be adequately carried out by a psychologist, however sound experimentally, who has no grasp of the social work picture. Whatever the duties of the agency psychologist, whether the emphasis is on appraisal or therapy, or is evenly divided, an interest in research matters, and an opportunity to do something about it, is essential.

It may be well to mention here a type of research problem which has interested us in this agency increasingly during the past two years, although it has not been feasible to take any appreciable action. We refer to research in treatment techniques: group therapy, play therapy, and counselling approaches of both the non-directive and the directive variety. We feel a pressing need of evaluating, in our own setting, the possible contribution of a non-directive approach as outlined by Carl Rogers.[8] Our position here is not the usual one, in which an individual comes and asks for help with a purely personal problem. For the most part our clients are asking for help, not for themselves in the throes of an emotional difficulty, but on behalf of another party: the child. Typically, the parent feels no need for help in his own emotional life, or in any event not to the point of asking us for help. In a large percentage of cases, the child himself is not in any explicit sense aware of a personal problem; he is often not at all disturbed by the way his life is going. To what extent is a non-directive approach feasible? Are there any general rules which can serve as guides, and, if so, how can the agency discover them? The consensus of opinion to date is that this approach, at least for adults, presupposes the presence of tension and, in effect, the question, "Will you help me with this tension?" But the research performed has been relatively trivial, as yet, and it would be indefensible to limit our thinking on the basis of such research. Then, too, the importance of feeling a personal need for help has already been rendered somewhat suspect by Axline's[9] work with young children, many of whom were doubtless "happy" at a superficial level and seemed happy to their own egos.

Many questions await solution, and obtaining the answers without experimenting unscrupulously with human lives will be difficult. But we think it can be done. Basic to any procedure, of course, will be the detailed effort of a skilled worker over a long period of time, the verbatim recording of interviews and the intensive study of the records by others familiar with cases of a similar kind. At least four people would be involved in such a research: the actual worker, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and another case

[8]Carl R. Rogers, *Counselling and Psychotherapy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947).

[9]V. M. Axline, *Play Therapy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947).

worker. It would, in many ways, be a heart-breaking type of research, with definitive information eluding one at every turn. But, as we see it, it has to be done.

Our increasing interest in the various "therapies" reflects, I suppose, a change which is taking place throughout the entire field of psychological science: a growing emphasis on the person himself rather than on his components. Factors, parts, units, have not today the research appeal that they once had, because we have finally realized in science what we have always known in everyday life, that people are neither sums nor products but "Gestalten" which are in a very real sense unitary rather than composite.

We believe that our search for significant common factors, like similar research elsewhere, has unearthed much useful material. At the same time, we realize that there is no such entity as a truly common factor and that no factor, home conditions or group memberships or parental discipline, is really the same in any two lives. These factors play different roles in different lives, and are never static influences which have a common significance in many lives. People, including boys, do not live in a world composed merely of physical objects and forces, or of common causal factors of whatever kind. They live in a world of meanings, and future research in social agencies must be guided by this general principle.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY

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WHILE philosophic inquiry into relevant ideals appears essential to individual and social moral development, psychological processes are inevitably involved in all valuation. The indisposition of man to reflect first and act afterward has been recognized from Plato to Freud. How rational foresight develops, inclusive of the concept of a better community and a more adequate world order, is a process requiring psychological analysis. The writer is convinced that a new approach to personal and social values is required. It will call for a recognition of results attained thus far in the investigation of the origin and structure of personality, so that we may see precisely what man is capable of with respect to values as traditionally stated, or, more probably, as contemporary thinkers will find it necessary to restate them.

I. THE GENETIC APPROACH TO MORALS

The new recognition of childhood has been sufficiently strong since the last decade of the nineteenth century to justify our calling the period "the age of the child." The tyranny which once prevailed in industry and in the schools has gradually become outmoded. Unprecedented interest in child welfare, a bulky literature written by and for parents, and a more intelligent adult attitude toward the child are characteristic of the twentieth century. In the work of John Dewey, a progressive educational method, based on a broader outlook, has come strongly to the fore. Because of the perspective provided by current educational psychology, the needs of society are seen more clearly. Consequently two shifts of study emphasis have occurred: from the behaviour patterns of the adult to those of the child; and from abnormal to normal child development. Social anthropology was the first field to see childhood as worthy of special study; it did so in its analytic investigation of social evolution. The constructive work of Sumner in his *Folkways*[1] gave, for the first time, sufficient consideration to the customs of children in society. Gradually, thinkers on social issues made an effort to discover the underlying forces of human relationships in terms of genuine explanation rather than mere description. In the attempt to conceptualize the processes lying beneath the manifest phenomena of child life, both scientific and popular literature moved the centre of discussion from the abnormal to the normal child.

What normality means, concretely, is discovered by noting the behaviour of children from varied backgrounds, and considering such factors as race problems, religion, parental differences, unusual brilliance, and sheer average ordinariness or mediocrity. The study of interpersonal relations reveals

[1]W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906).

that one or more persons usually impinge on the development of every child. As a rule one person holds a dominant relation, but the group effect on individual behaviour also constitutes a strong influence. In either case the influence of a social relation is in direct proportion to the degree of intimacy. As we shall see, the family group and the play group are fundamental determinants in early social interaction and in the emergence of moral behaviour.

As we study the interactive processes of society we see that there are certain possibilities: passivity, conflict, active adaptation. These become the matrix for morality, even as they are the "emergents" of social interaction. Passivity is found to be normal when the child takes, in the home, as part of his group, its clothing, its food, its mannerisms; later, the enlarged pattern of his culture involves further passive adaptation. The common ways of people are unconsciously and without question "taken on" by the individual. The child acquires that which *is* the cultural pattern. The mores are the focal points in social interaction which become clarified as the child realizes what is approved and what is not approved. Institutions present a variety of ritual and particular kinds of activity, and conformity to these, involving punctuality, attendance, discipline, is quite general among children. Thus, passive adaptation is a normal process of social interaction. We may comment at this point that it becomes detrimental only when the child retains the attitude of passivity without going on to the development of other essential social processes. The movement should be away from passive adaptation and towards full, active participation with family, community, and society. We shall note throughout this paper what is involved in such a movement.

II. The Ingredients of Ethical Behaviour

The "instinct theory" is not so dominant now as it was among psychologists a few decades ago. Why it is not is discovered by considering the ways in which types of social activity are actually observed to develop in young children. As we have seen, the family is the beginning. A baby's smile at another person is a form of social response. There is a beginning, too, in recognition of faces. Later, more complex patterns occur; to these the baby reacts differentially. Those who most often feed, bathe, and play with the infant, receive the greatest degree of its response in affection. A very small child (say of eleven months) will frequently respond more affectionately to a nurse than to a busy mother or aunt. Generally, however, one person, the mother, holds a unique position in the emotional aspect of the child's social development. "Mother love" is not a "blind instinct." It is a complex sentiment and is based on a rich experience freighted with affective content. Thus we have emotional conditioning.

Reciprocal love between father and baby appears to develop in proportion

to the degree of affection and loving attention shown by the father. But just as positive emotional responses to people may be conditioned in young children, so may negative ones be conditioned. Some children never learn to love an apparently autocratic and stern parent until old enough to understand the various situations which bring forth displeasing refusals. And some children, no doubt, never do acquire such love. Thus, the data of social behaviour are such as to emphasize early-fixated social responses to the family, particularly to the father and the mother. These responses are part of the raw material for other kinds of development. They are "conditionings" which become generalized to other types of social activity. Positive and negative modes of social conduct are inherent in these beginning phases of life.

The development of behaviour socially involves the bipolarity of competitiveness or aggressiveness, and sympathy. Competitiveness means striving to outdo or excel some other person; since this requires conscious, purposive activity to some degree, there should be no competitive behaviour in early infancy. Experimental data show, however, that some babies seem to be naturally non-resistant in their responses while other babies are quite sensitive to interference with their doings. As children grow, a certain "egocentrism" appears to mark their activities. Curti illustrates this egocentric behaviour: children building a "pretty" house with blocks will each, in response to the question, "Which is prettier?" answer, "Mine!"[2]

While the writings of Freud and other psychoanalysts stress aggression along with sex as a major "instinct" or need, it is probably safe to say that the competitive spirit is not a particular behaviour characteristic of all child life. Instead of being conceived of as a native "drive," it may more properly be regarded as a loosely knit tendency based on constitutional characteristics, but growing according to the conditions of the social soil in which the child's life is placed. Competitive tendencies are intimately related to and largely dependent upon customs and ideals, implicit or expressed, of the particular cultural milieu in which the child grows up. This may be seen in the readiness of the small child to "take to" the mores of his family. Also, the roots of sympathy are in the family life. A child who is well cared for and has, perhaps, an inherited tendency to respond with sensitivity, will in all likelihood show a natural "outgoingness." Moreover, in the development of sympathy, imitativeness is a relevant and dynamic factor. Through capacities developed early, children become conditioned to respond to the tears and smiles, mannerisms, and even yawns, of those around them. A positive correlation appears to exist between sympathy and aggressiveness. L. B. Murphy,[3] in a native experiment with children in play situations, found that a child who is more active than others makes more contacts of

[2]M. W. Curti, *Child Psychology* (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1940), 376.

[3]See G. and L. B. Murphy, and T. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), Chap. VIII.

all kinds than do others, contacts both aggressive and sympathetic. Linking these results to the ambivalent competitive-co-operative tendencies of American life, she believes this correspondence to be a correlate of that ambivalence.

The "egocentrism" of the little child is an apparently unavoidable co-implicate of his relative paucity of experience socially. Because of various stimuli which he experiences, the baby has a "first class" problem on his hands to find out who he *himself* is, and what is his centre. It is not strange, then, that he should be concerned with his own needs. He soon begins, however, to wish for the experiences others have, and also, he gradually learns to want to be like others. It is common to find deliberate imitation of the activities of others in the behaviour of very young children. Personologists, such as W. Stern, have pointed to the significance, for personality development, of "make-believe" play among young children, which consists in pretending to be someone else. From a basis, therefore, of native constitutional characteristics, the baby gradually learns (especially when he becomes able to handle language) to be socialized; that is, his language and thought and conduct all reflect increasing interest in other people and an ability to see things from their point of view.

The more detailed analysis of the ingredients of ethical behaviour reveals that the family usually, though not always, reflects the culture of the whole society; family influence is therefore a compelling one. After the family, the whole weight of society is effective in impressing on the developing child the ways and ideas which dominate that society. As the Canadian child psychologist, W. E. Blatz, has emphasized, there are no generally established innate modes of social response. Curti, too, discards the view that there are social or gregarious instincts in the traditional sense.[4] It is not essential, for example, that one should eat with others; the custom happens to have developed as a convenience. So also, intercultural and interpersonal investigations reveal that competitiveness may be a strong motivating force in some groups and not in others, in some persons and not in others, and even at a later period in the life of a child though not in an earlier one. It is found that competitiveness, sympathy, co-operativeness, race prejudice, social understanding, pugnacity, acquisitiveness, benevolence, and many other social attitudes and traits, all flourish in certain soils more readily than in others.[5] All these characteristics involve fundamental types of motivation in society and they may or may not be dominant in certain individuals and in certain specific cultures. They are not "instincts."

III. Ethical Conduct

To demarcate social and ethical conduct is not easy. From the psychological point of view at least, ethical conduct is socially acceptable conduct.

[4] *Child Psychology*, 387.
[5] *Ibid.*, 387.

To say that the converse of this is true might be a legitimate inference. It might lead, however, to philosophic discussion which, at this point in our exposition, is premature; we shall note the point later. Meanwhile, it is useful to analyse the elements in the beginnings of antisocial conduct with a view to understanding ethical conduct. Individuals experience stimulating situations which recurrently dominate behaviour to such an extent that a persistent course of action results as a response to them. The situations demand satisfaction. Usually such situations are intra-organic and have to do with certain fundamental physiological appetites or motives which constantly are potentially present and frequently call for relief. Something must be done. The urge is imperious. In the light of this fact, antisocial conduct can be understood. It is not the case that those who do not commit delinquencies are *necessarily* better fed or have more money than delinquents. When unethical conduct occurs, we are confronted with a complex situation involving varieties of motivation with reference to the facets of the social field and the needs of the individual. The situation is problematic and the individual has somehow to solve it. Like any animal, the young human acts in response to the situation as long as the motivating urge continues to impel him in the direction of some solution.

Occasionally a "trial-and-error" adjustment may be made which satisfies the underlying motive. However, it quite frequently happens that no direct adjustment can easily be made, and, in consequence, indirectly satisfying pursuits may put an end to the trial-and-error behaviour. These pursuits may turn out to be of a substitute or compensatory kind, and may be implicit or overt. Sometimes projective rationalizations, such as the "sour grapes" and "sweet lemon" attitudes, will help the individual to reduce the painfulness of the problem; it is found that even hysteria has its value in enabling the individual to cope with or lessen the acute disagreeableness of the problematic situation. As he grows older the young human may find a means of getting at least temporary satisfaction through the use of alcohol. Suicide is not infrequently regarded as the final way out. However, delinquent acts more usually appear to the doer as psychologically logical solutions to problematic situations. The restlessness of the frustrated individual leads to stresses; he does something, and it may be something "bad." Sometimes when the stress is a social one, as differing from intra-organic, a delinquent act may be a means, more or less purposive and deliberate, of defying a parental authority which is regarded as unjust. Or, a boy who is doing poorly in his school work may break the windows or damage the buildings in order to gain the recognition he needs but cannot obtain by scholastic achievement. Curti is of the opinion that when we have an eye to the various possibilities for action, delinquency need not be regarded as necessarily the "worst" way out.[6] Of course it may develop into major criminality and this, by any definition of morality, would be "worse." But

⁶*Ibid.*, 397.

sometimes antisocial acts show the presence of strong and quite positive personality characteristics which, with a process of re-education, may be turned to very good account.

If human adjustment involves trial-and-error learning as well as conditioning and insight, then we may view delinquency as an "error" in the adjustive process. In this light, delinquent conduct is seen to be one of the common effects of certain antecedent or previous conditions. The initial act of delinquency may not relieve the main motivating factors; and, even if it does, it may lead to other effects, emotionally charged, such as shame and remorse. These latter may become intrapersonal motives stronger than the original ones. If this occurs, the antisocial act may not recur. However, should it not lead to serious consequences in terms of social disapproval, lack of security or prestige, it may become fixed. The doctrine of "fixation," in this connection, would indicate that the committing of an antisocial or unethical act, if it brings satisfaction and does not lead to results which outweigh the value of the satisfaction, will probably be performed again, other things being equal, on the recurrence of a similar problematic situation. There is, then, the persistence of such "habits." Once activity is fixated as the satisfaction of a motive, it comes, in Woodworth's phrase, to "furnish its own drive." The entire problem of antisocial or delinquent conduct turns out, therefore, to be rather intricate. It enables us to see what is involved in the psychological processes of ethical conduct.

Now, developing ethical conduct in children requires that we recognize that children have neither an innate moral sense nor a state of "original sin." In the language of Blatz, "they are neither good nor bad, but indifferent": they are non-moral and they may be morally conditioned for good or bad according to arrangements provided in the environment. The aims of ethical training would seem to require that the child adjust to the conditions of his world as he finds them; this realism involves, however, a regard for the welfare of his fellows (sociality), and requires that his life should be integrated so that there is a harmony in the satisfaction of the various intraorganic and social motives. Just as the child learns, if well instructed, that there is no hierarchy in the various parts of his body, in their moral worth, so he should learn that no one aspect of life is to be completely sacrificed to other aspects.

Writers in the field of character education are more than ever aware that the acquisition of socially acceptable habits, that is, the fulfilment of the aims just stated, occurs in particular situations. It may be true that honesty is a virtue which, as the philosophers inform us, resides in the quality of the particular act performed, but there would seem to be considerable doubt whether it is a general trait ramifying all situations of the individual's life.[7] Deceptiveness would appear to be nothing more nor less

[7] Cf. R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (New York: Holt and Company, 1940), Chap. 5.

than a loosely knit order or system of habits and attitudes which have been learned by the individual in special situations, and which are then ready to function in similar situations. The child, for example, finds, when he plays truant from school, specific situations favourable to stealing.[8]

Ethical standards are grounded in and take their rise from the spontaneous native and acquired reactive tendencies of the organism. In connection with native and learned responses which are already actively functioning in particular situations, verbal formulae come to be expressed and are called ethical principles. Early moral judgments of children are in all likelihood based on the character of the immediate objects of their first experiences, and the responses thereby elicited. These childish standards become progressively socialized. As the child observes the social consequences of his acts, as well as their consequences to himself, he envisions more comprehensively the rules involved in the meshwork of his relations with others. He comes, in this way, to seek to control, in the light of present experience, the possible consequences which he foresees. Here lies the basis for all morality. Moreover, social influence on ethical growth is achieved through teaching of a direct kind. But the child probably learns a great deal more through example than through precept. Knowledge of consequences is best gained concretely. In specific situations the child learns that he must accept responsibility for the consequences of his actions. And knowledge of consequences makes volitional ethical control possible.[9] Consequences of acts are *symbolically reinstated before performance*.

The implications of these principles may be stated. Unless verbal teaching is based on responses in particular, definite situations, it is useless and valueless. Any ethical behaviour that is to be consistent must be achieved as the child learns responses for varied concrete problematic situations. As similar facets of new situations are "labeled" for the child, suitable responses are likely to be called forth. The individual gets ethical "practice" in relations with household servants, with foreign street vendors, with immigrant neighbours, as well as with those of his "in-group." A child, given experience of varied new situations, learns to analyse and label modes of behaviour different from those with which he has become well acquainted. Here lies the psychological ground for understanding different peoples of varied race, religion, and politico-economic ideology.

IV. THE MORAL JUDGMENT

It may be said that the above discussion does not really get to the heart of the ethical question, i.e. the character of the moral judgment. The work of Piaget, at the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, Geneva, constitutes one of the most extensive attempts in this century to discover the nature of children's moral judgments, and to generalize from this discovery to

[8]Curti, *Child Psychology*, 387.
[9]*Ibid.*, 403.

desirable goals in educational theory. Piaget conducted a series of brilliant researches into the development of democratic morality as shown in the group activities of children.[10] With regard to the experience of morality in child consciousness, Piaget proposed to concern himself with the moral judgment and not with moral behaviour or sentiments. As in his investigations on children's conceptions of the world[11] and of causality,[12] he uses the method of questioning. His data are the fruit of conversations with children. He is ever aware of the danger of making the child say what one wants him to say, and finds that there is no infallible remedy to avoid this danger completely. The child's spontaneous remarks are found to be even more valuable than his direct responses to questions. Piaget's purpose in his work is simply to supply a scaffolding for erecting an edifice of more complete moral knowledge.

It is important that we state clearly Piaget's method as it was actually used. He believes that the only good method in the study of moral facts is to observe as closely as possible the greatest available number of individuals. He finds that one can make the child reason about a problem in physics or logic but that one cannot make him act in a laboratory in order to dissect his moral conduct. Piaget finds that it is only the domain of *games* that gives the setting for the use of methods of the laboratory. Here we are enabled to analyse a reality in the making. As to the moral rules which the child receives from the adult, Piaget asserts that no direct investigation is to be thought of by mere interrogation. Difficult as the precedure is, he invites us to make the best of it and to try to examine, not the act, but simply the judgment of moral value; we are to analyse not the child's actual decisions only, nor his memory of his actions, but the way he evaluates a given piece of conduct.

This Swiss investigator selected marbles and tested the morality of children in great numbers by means of this game. The child is permitted to state the rules of the game. As the game proceeds it is found that he shows an increasing neglect or forgetfulness of the rules and attempts to play with regard only for his own interests. The child is *egocentric*. He quickly persuades himself that his playing is "right." There are obvious evidences of the acquisitive character of his playing. Moreover, it does not matter what his companion is doing, only that he is not attempting to play "against" him. This egocentric stage is associated with *motor* activity, primarily, in reference to the rules of the game. It is a stage which gives place to a secondary level of analysis, however, when we come to consider *consciousness* of the rules.

[10]J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1932).

[11]J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of the World* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1929).

[12]J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1930).

The next stage, then, which is not merely psychomotor but *social,* reveals that consciousness of rules cannot be isolated from the moral life of the child as a whole. At this stage, the reflection of the child is revealed in one incident cited. On being asked what happened when his rules conflicted with those of someone else, a child answered, "We scrap for a bit and then we fix things up."[13] The kinds of questions Piaget posed to children in the game of marbles were: "Can the rules be changed? Have rules always been the same as they are today? How did rules begin?" He regards the first question as the best; it appears to be least verbal and theoretical, at least it does not lack immediate relevance. His findings, at this point, show an extension of the principle of egocentric domination: the child more or less pleases himself in his application of the rules. (This occurs, generally, below the age of ten.) But beyond egocentrism, and approached more definitely as consciousness of rules increases, is what Piaget calls the experience of sociocentrism. Gradually, as the social stage progresses, there is a shift. One child, when asked what was fair in application of the rules of those playing the game, replied, "Both the same," meaning that children had equal rights. Another child, when questioned as to the reason for the rules, responded, "So as not to be always quarrelling; you must have rules and then play properly."[14] Again, a child said, "Sometimes people play differently. Then you ask each other what you want to do."[15] Thus there is a progression from egocentricity to the changed attitude in which a new rule is declared better than an old one. It simply requires that the new rule gain all or most of the votes of those concerned. The progression involves a cooperation which liberates individuals from egocentrism, and introduces a new and more immanent conception of rules. Ethical significance is seen in the change from a mere psychomotor rule, involving "unilateral respect," to the view whereby the child is led to see that he "ought" to play as others, and perhaps especially as his elders or "superiors," do. Piaget acknowledges that beyond these two types of rules lies the fuller conception of rational rule which is based on mutual respect. As previously noted, this might involve philosophic inquiry; thus Piaget is ready to admit that his analysis of the moral judgments of children in the game of marbles has led him into deep waters. At this point he appears to show Kantian leanings in philosophy.[16] "Respect for personality," and "treating others as ends, not means," are precepts seen to emerge in child development.

Because of the great importance of Piaget's work, we shall scrutinize in greater detail his view of child morality as it emerges from experimentation. Piaget arrives at a view of moral judgment in the child which is

[13] J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child,* 64.

[14] *Ibid.,* 163.

[15] *Ibid.* The answer came from a child of the ten-to-eleven age group.

[16] More exactly, Piaget reaches conclusions from his empirical studies which Kant arrived at by reflective analysis; certainly Piaget did not hold to an innate moral categorical imperative.

twofold, involving social constraint and co-operation. While the two are related, he feels that they should be more sharply contrasted than they usually are. The former is perhaps nothing more than the pressure of one generation upon another; the latter constitutes the deepest and most important social relation that can contribute to the development of the norms of reason. Constraint and "unilateral respect" on the one hand, and co-operation and mutual respect on the other, represent the "two groups of social and moral facts."[17] Piaget finds that in the development of the higher forms of morality there is progressive regularity according to age. He asserts, moreover, on the basis of his observations, that there is a definite ability in children to make fine distinctions in moral judgment. For example, a child can observe two identical acts, say, of taking scissors, one act involving no knowledge that the scissors should not be taken, and the other act involving such knowledge. A child's answer, when questioned, was: "The first one did not do it on purpose. You can't say that she was naughty."

In consequence of his investigations, Piaget teaches a doctrine of "moral realism" as the fruit of constraint and of the primitive forms of unilateral respect. He admits that he should not carry his generalizations to an extreme, remembering that most, if not all, of the child's answers are given in response to stories that are told him; hence they do not arise out of spontaneously experienced facts. However, he seriously asserts that from an inherently necessary, spontaneous, and unconscious egocentrism belonging to the individual as such, there is development to the level of adult constraint, and finally, arrival at the stage of co-operation. Egocentrism combines more readily with adult constraint, since it involves amalgamation of child-family characteristics, than it does with co-operation. It is in the last stage that the child reaches, as nearly as he can (that is, in his own terms), moral autonomy. Piaget finds that at this "highest" level, children demand equality in reference to ideas of justice, co-operation, and so forth. Having developed, therefore, in the genetic manner described, this level of judgment appears to function *a priori*; it is not innate, but may rather be regarded as a norm. Herein, then, we see the moral evolution of the child. The concept of authority, whether construed in terms of one's ego-demands or in terms of family characteristics, is transformed by the concept of mutual respect; hence a democratic basis for authority is reached.

In the field of morality Piaget comes to a view practically identical with that of Durkheim :[18] that morality is to be explained by social life. Indeed, child morality takes us to the heart of the problems studied by social psychology and social philosophy. The highly significant truth emerging from the developmental study of morality, in regard to the individual-society

[17] J. Piaget, *op. cit.*, 103.

[18] See J. Piaget, *op. cit.*, 364; though it must be admitted that Piaget disagrees with Durkheim in many respects. He discusses thoroughly Durkheim's theories in his final chapter.

relation, is that co-operation alone leads to autonomy. Piaget is convinced that co-operation can and ought to be universally applied as a method of education. (John Dewey, as noted above, was a pioneer in this field in America.)[19] Educational experiment, scientifically controlled, is more instructive for psychology than any number of laboratory experiments, according to Piaget; and since this is so, experimental pedagogy might well be incorporated into the body of the psycho-sociological disciplines.

We have dwelt at length on Piaget's work, because of its unique relevance. The untimely death of Eugene Lerner brought to a close the most promising extension of the techniques employed by Piaget: Lerner particularly noted the growth of moral autonomy as a "dynamic aspect of moral perspective."[20] The present brief discussion does not permit elaboration of his studies.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is possible to combine two contemporary concepts in the theory of personality (that of "functional autonomy,"[21] and that of a "hierarchy of conditionings"[22]), with respect to the psychological development and structure of morality. Passing through the stages of egocentrism and moral constraint to the stage of democratic mutual respect, the individual reveals an evolution which is at once a conditioning process and an emergence of autonomous emancipation from "lower level" motivation. The far-reaching importance of personality formation in the psychological determination of morality and value-experience is evident. Our rich literature in child psychology and sociology justifies the view that morality of a highly satisfactory kind can arise in a free environment. The traditional authoritarian concepts of morality, whether politically or religiously based, do not reach the level of human dignity and responsibility implied in the democratic way of life; this way, as has been seen, is grounded in the concrete relations of human beings from their earliest years.

The individual develops in an environment which provides the origins and structure of personality in its social and moral relationships. The implications of the discussion which we have undertaken are clear. Principles deriving from experimental studies, principles which form the basis of a democratic morality are: (1) freedom, that a man render obedience to no other rules than those to which the majority have voluntarily given consent; (2) equality, that a man recognize among the members of his group no

[19]See my article, "The Matrix of Dewey's Theory of Education" in *Education* (March, 1948), Palmer Co., Boston, Mass.

[20]E. Lerner, "The Problem of Perspective in Moral Reasoning" (*American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII, No. 2, September 1937, 249).

[21]G. W. Allport, "Geneticism Versus Ego-Structure in Theories of Personality" *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, XVI, Pt. II, June 1946, 57-68).

[22]G. Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947).

superior, except it be understood that he has equal rights to demand that the leader obey the rules of the group, just as he himself does; (3) independence, that a man owes his being and well-being, not to the dictatorial will of any other individual, but to his own rights and powers as a member of the community; (4) personal representation, that a man, the rightness of whose conduct has been called in question, has the privilege to speak for himself. With a view to the development of the free exercise of the principles, it becomes incumbent upon the parents, teachers, and moral leaders of our times so to arrange the physical and social environment that democratic morality is psychologically possible. What the individual parent usually wants for his own child, that, as Dewey has reminded us, society must want for all its children.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The School of Graduate Studies, and the Graduate Department of Psychology of the University of Toronto announce a lecture by Prof. E. Lowell Kelly, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan on "Current Trends in Clinical Psychology," to take place on February 3 at 4 p.m. in the theatre auditorium of the Royal Ontario Museum. Visitors are invited to attend.

Professor Kelly has been in charge of a very extensive programme of research for the U.S. Veterans' Administration on the selection of students for training in clinical psychology. He has also been active in the development of graduate training centres for clinical psychologists sponsored by a committee of the American Psychological Association.

BOOK REVIEWS

Physiological Psychology. By G. L. FREEMAN. Toronto: D. Van Nostrand
  Co. Inc., 1948. Pp. 530. $4.50

THOSE who have found *Introduction to Physiological Psychology* by Free-
man a valuable teaching aid or a useful reference work will be pleased to
know that it continues to be available under a new title and distributed by
a new publisher. Those who hope to find in *Physiological Psychology* a new
text are almost certain to be disappointed. Although new material has been
added and some minor reorganization effected, the systematic orientation,
the major emphases, and the organization of the book are not changed.

Part One, Basic Mechanisms in Behaviour, opens with introductory
chapters on The Field of Physiological Psychology and Development of
Neural Mechanisms. Then receptor, effector, and adjustor mechanisms
are inventoried and described, in terms of both their structural and func-
tional characteristics. Part Two, The Structuro-Functional Organization
of Bodily Mechanisms, deals with the structure and functions of the central
nervous system, first in cross-section by reaction levels and then longitudin-
ally in terms of afferent and efferent conduction systems. Part Three, The
Integrative Action of Bodily Mechanisms, treats spinal integration (based
largely upon Sherrington's treatment of the subject), integration at the
sub-cortical level, in which emotional reaction is the primary topic of dis-
cussion, and integration at the cortical level. Cortical integration is dis-
cussed chiefly in terms of perceptual processes with mention also of invention
and remembering. Facilitation and inhibition of action are specifically con-
sidered as processes through which integration is achieved, and several
theories of facilitation and inhibition are evaluated. Part Four contains
chapters on motivation, neuromuscular sets and postures, learning, decre-
ment, and personality.

Part One presents little that is not found in the better introductory text-
books in psychology. For many possible uses of the text, this section might
well have been condensed or omitted in favour of a fuller treatment of the
topics in Part Four. Part Two is a concise and valuable summary of neuro-
anatomy and neurophysiology. Likewise the section on the integrative
action of bodily mechanisms provides a useful digest of important concepts
and theories. The chapters on Neuromuscular Sets and Postures, and Decre-
ment, Fatigue and Oscillation are, in the opinion of the reviewer, the most
valuable chapters in the book. The chapters on learning and personality,
on the other hand, are highly selective and give little indication of much of
the important animal and clinical work which has been reported in these
areas. One might easily gain the impression that no important extirpation
work has been performed since Lashley. Research on "experimental
neurosis" receives only passing comment and the important topic of per-

sonality disturbances associated with brain damage or brain surgery is mentioned only briefly in a sentence and a footnote.

The new text, as was the old, is troubled by many spelling and typographical errors. The illustrations are printed with greater clarity, but one might justifiably expect that the advances of thirteen years of research and improved techniques of illustration would have recommended more extensive revision than is found. Of the 184 figures, only sixteen are new and four others have been reworked. The footnotes are an important part of the textual revision and should not be overlooked. They contain many references to the more recent literature.

Although one might have hoped for a more thoroughgoing revision, *Physiological Psychology* must be recognized as an important contribution to the psychological literature, as it provides a clear and systematic treatment of a large and diverse body of facts and speculations.

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Dimensions of Personality. By H. J. Eysenck. London: Kegan Paul, 1947. Pp. xi, 308. 25 shillings.

THIS book should be read by all psychologists interested in personality either from the theoretical or clinical point of view. Although the title gives promise of a broad treatment, the book was not designed as a general text in the subject and is not recommended for beginners in the field of personality. It is a technical research study, or rather a series of researches, which were done by a team of psychiatrists and psychologists at the Mill Hill Emergency Hospital, London, a war-time neurosis centre. As the author himself points out, most of the data were gathered from neurotic service personnel; thus, in general, the findings are applicable only to the neurotic population from which they were derived. There were also, however, normal subjects used in several researches.

The author begins by defining his terms and outlining a theory of personality aimed at reconciling the "general" and the "specific" points of view. This theory involves various levels of organization, reminiscent of McDougall's hierarchy in "sentiments" or Allport's levels produced by integration.

In the subsequent factorial analysis of personality, the author establishes two undisputed (statistical) dimensions, the first of which he labels neuroticism, and the second, the hysteric-dysthymic factor. Eysenck agrees that the latter could be translated into the more familiar terminology "extroversion-introversion," provided one keeps in mind that the dysthymic and hysteric are the *neurotic* introvert and extrovert.

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The author then proceeds to analyse the constellation of traits that make up the hysteric and the dysthymic type. Following is a series of interesting experiments under the general chapter headings of (1) physique and constitution, (2) ability and efficiency, (3) suggestibility and hypnosis, (4) appreciation and expression. Tests of some traits, as suggestibility, were found to distinguish well between normals and neurotics; other traits, as rigidity and persistence, showed differences between the hysteric and dysthymic groups. All the data were subjected to precise statistical treatment and a useful summary of the results is given at the end of each chapter.

Eysenck's results throw light on several controversial questions in the field of personality. To give one illustration, his findings are opposed to Janet's theory of the positive relationship between hysteria and suggestibility. The conclusions drawn from the present work were: (1) suggestibility is closely related to neuroticism; (2) suggestibility is not related more closely to hysteria than it is to other neurotic disorders (the data even indicate that dysthymics are more suggestible than hysterics).

The author stresses the fact that in using terms such as "suggestibility," "persistence," and "rigidity" to summarize his results, he does not intend them to be interpreted in a popular sense. They refer to exact quantitative variables, statistically derived. (In spite of this, however, he introduces his early discussion of these variables with a brief survey of previous views and experiments, which for the most part were non-statistical and representative of the "popular" concepts). Even using the most careful statistical methods, one is eventually faced with the problem of giving psychological meaning to the derived factors, and it would appear that Eysenck's general organization of the book implicitly recognizes this fact—even though he emphasizes the purely statistical reality of his variables.

In an interesting final chapter the author gives a synthesis of his findings and outlines the conclusions that can be safely drawn. This chapter would have been better, in the reviewer's opinion, if the author had confined himself to pulling together the experiments already presented, and had omitted the introduction of new data at this point. Two appendices are included, one, *An Experimental Study in the Methodology of Factor Analysis*, the other, *Static Ataxia as an Index of Neuroticism*. And finally, there is an excellent bibliography.

Eysenck has set a high standard for this type of research, and his successful use of objective and statistical techniques augurs well for the future of experimental work in personality.

<div align="right">LOUISE M. THOMPSON</div>

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MARITIME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

FOR some time there has been felt a need for some organization which would bring Maritime psychologists together. In April, 1948, a meeting of interested persons was held at King's College, Halifax, and preliminary discussions on the nature of the organization and its constitution took place. Later, in May, another meeting of a similar nature was held at the University of New Brunswick. On October 9, a final meeting was held in Moncton with an attendance of some twenty persons representing various fields of psychological interest, and the preliminary work came to fruition in the formation of the Maritime Psychological Association.

Professor Vernon of Acadia University presided at the meeting, at which the minutes of the previous discussions were read, and the draft constitution approved.

The purpose of the association is the "furtherance of psychology as a science, as a profession, and as a means of promoting human welfare." This is with particular regard to the needs of the Maritime provinces.

The following officers of the executive were elected for the current year:

Honorary President, Dr. G. J. Trueman, President Emeritus, Mount Allison University

President, Professor W. H. D. Vernon, Acadia University

Vice-President, Dr. C. A. Baxter, Mount Allison University

Secretary-Treasurer, Miss Ellen Piers, Neuro-psychiatric Division of the Department of Public Health, N.S.

The following Committee Chairmen were appointed:

Training and Certification (Membership), Professor F. H. Page, Dalhousie University.

Research, Dr. Louise Thompson, University of New Brunswick

Teaching of Psychology, Dr. Marion Grant, Acadia University

After the business session, Dr. Nicholas Hobbs of Columbia University read a stimulating paper on "Recent Contributions to the Concept of the Self." This was followed by a lively and enthusiastic discussion.

CANADIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
1949 ANNUAL MEETING

Place: Mount Royal Hotel, Montreal

Date: May 26, 27, 28

Convention to be opened and guests welcomed by His Honour Mayor Camillien Houde.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Requests for papers now being sent out by the Chairman of the programme committee, Douglas J. Wilson, c/o Montreal Daily Star, Montreal. Members are reminded that the deadline for the submission of abstracts of proposed papers is March 15, 1949.

RESERVATIONS

Our annual meeting overlaps with the convention of the American Psychiatric Association, the members of which have already booked three thousand rooms in hotel-short Montreal.

We have, so far, been able to reserve only two hundred beds (mostly in double rooms).

If you expect to attend this annual meeting, please make your reservation *now!*

It will not be easy to secure last-minute accommodation, and it will make everything simpler for all concerned, including you, if we can learn in advance—that is, NOW—for how many visitors we must prepare.

For your own comfort, write today, stating the accommodation you will require, to

F. R. Clarke, Chairman, Arrangements Committee,
B7 Board of Trade Building, Montreal

(Rates: Single room $5 per day up; Double bed $7.70 per day up; Twin beds, $9 per day up ($4.50 each). Reservations will be confirmed by the Hotel.)